Stick895
Gold Member
This outfit does tours and dome include the South Pacific. Welcome to Military Historical Tours If I have anything such as a bucket list, a tour like this and scuba diving in Iron Bottom Sound are on it.
Bougainville/Solomons close to Australia
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dmccarty
Super Star Member
I have seen documentaries with these guys and read some things on them. I really want to do a few of their tours.
Later,
Dan
2LaneCruzer
Super Member
I certainly wasn't a member 5 years ago, but I was a student of WWII, aircraft in general, and the the war in the Pacific in particular. I have read Pappy Boyington's book and Chuck Yeager's book, but my favorite is "Whistling Death", the story of the F4U's development. It is written by Boone T. Guyton, the test pilot from its beginning in about 1938 up until WWII. If there's on thing I have learned over the years, it's that there is no "best" fighter plane. Each one is a bit different, and therefore "better" or "worse" in some way.
The F4U, for example, is a fire breathing thoroughbred that was powerful, manuverable and fast. When in the hands of a skilled (i.e., experienced) pilot, it had few equals, but in the hands of a young, inexperienced pilot, it was unforgiving. Its vision was limited, due to the long nose (in fact, it was known as Old Hose Nose; the nose was lengthened to add more fuel capacity). It was not used on carriers until 1944 because pilots had a hard time seeing the landing deck. The British, however, had been using a technique, later adopted by the Americans, which made carrier landings feasable.
The pilots would approach the carrier at an angle where they could see the flight deck and then make a quick turn and set the plane down. Don't ask me how, but it seemed to work. The bent wings were to accommodate the long, 13 foot prop, and the landing gear had to be strengthened for carrier landings.
The Grumman Hellcat was probably a better carrier plane in at least one regard; it was a pilot's aircraft, designed by a company experienced in building carrier arcraft, to be flown by young and inexperienced pilots. It had better vision, and was very forgiving. It was built tough as nails and was almost as fast as the Corsair. Grumman could build them faster than the Navy could use them up; in fact, the government had to tell Grumman to slow production even before the war was over. The Hellcat was more than equal to the Zero in the hands of a capable pilot, and had a kill ratio of 19:1 as compared to the Corsair, whose ratio was 11:1. I can't account for these differences, but it could be do to several things, none of which have to do with the superiority of the particular aircraft. One thing I got from Chuck Yeager's book is that even in an inferior aircraft, a good pilot can make all the difference.
Interestingly enough, the old Wildcats were produced all through the war, and in the latter part of the war were used on the "jeep" carriers...smaller carriers used as escorts and submarine hunters. The Wildcats worked well on the short flight decks and were heavily armed. The landing gear was manually retracted by the pilot using a hand crank. A few years back, I met a fellow at a car show who was a Wildcat pilot. Although I don't recall the number, he was able to remember just how many cranks it took to retract the gear. When I told him what great admiration I had for him and the "Greatest Generation", his remark was: "****, we didn't consider ourselves heroes, none of us figured we would survive the war anyway".
The F4U, for example, is a fire breathing thoroughbred that was powerful, manuverable and fast. When in the hands of a skilled (i.e., experienced) pilot, it had few equals, but in the hands of a young, inexperienced pilot, it was unforgiving. Its vision was limited, due to the long nose (in fact, it was known as Old Hose Nose; the nose was lengthened to add more fuel capacity). It was not used on carriers until 1944 because pilots had a hard time seeing the landing deck. The British, however, had been using a technique, later adopted by the Americans, which made carrier landings feasable.
The pilots would approach the carrier at an angle where they could see the flight deck and then make a quick turn and set the plane down. Don't ask me how, but it seemed to work. The bent wings were to accommodate the long, 13 foot prop, and the landing gear had to be strengthened for carrier landings.
The Grumman Hellcat was probably a better carrier plane in at least one regard; it was a pilot's aircraft, designed by a company experienced in building carrier arcraft, to be flown by young and inexperienced pilots. It had better vision, and was very forgiving. It was built tough as nails and was almost as fast as the Corsair. Grumman could build them faster than the Navy could use them up; in fact, the government had to tell Grumman to slow production even before the war was over. The Hellcat was more than equal to the Zero in the hands of a capable pilot, and had a kill ratio of 19:1 as compared to the Corsair, whose ratio was 11:1. I can't account for these differences, but it could be do to several things, none of which have to do with the superiority of the particular aircraft. One thing I got from Chuck Yeager's book is that even in an inferior aircraft, a good pilot can make all the difference.
Interestingly enough, the old Wildcats were produced all through the war, and in the latter part of the war were used on the "jeep" carriers...smaller carriers used as escorts and submarine hunters. The Wildcats worked well on the short flight decks and were heavily armed. The landing gear was manually retracted by the pilot using a hand crank. A few years back, I met a fellow at a car show who was a Wildcat pilot. Although I don't recall the number, he was able to remember just how many cranks it took to retract the gear. When I told him what great admiration I had for him and the "Greatest Generation", his remark was: "****, we didn't consider ourselves heroes, none of us figured we would survive the war anyway".
The F4U is my favorite plane. Maybe because I watched Black Sheep Squadron as an early teen.
I found it interesting that while production of other WWII planes anded at the end of the war, Corsair production continued till 1956. And in the last known combat, a Corsair shot down a Mustang(Football War in Honduras). France had Corsairs in service into the mid 60's.
I found it interesting that while production of other WWII planes anded at the end of the war, Corsair production continued till 1956. And in the last known combat, a Corsair shot down a Mustang(Football War in Honduras). France had Corsairs in service into the mid 60's.
2LaneCruzer
Super Member
Then you probably would enjoy Boone Guyton's book "Whistling Death". The Japanese called it Whistling Death because of the sound coming from the oil coolers at high speed. I actually read the book twice it was so good. Another book I recommend highly is entitled "Reach for the Sky". A book by a British pilot who lost both legs in an accident before the war, but ended up flying Spitfires during the war. His name was Douglas Bader, and he was quite a pilot.
Most of what I know of the F4U, is from reading Pappy Boyington's book, and reading "F4U Corsair at War" by Richard Abrams.
I also had interesting discussions with Dale Berven, a docent on the USS-Hornet, and his friend Julie(I can not remember Julie's last name...). Julie was great; I had a nice discussion with him while checking out a Corsair at the Palm Springs Air Museum, where he was a docent. Both flew Corsairs off Carriers in late WWII, and in to Korea. They also got to fly the first Cougar/Panthers.
This is an interesting video Dale made. Julie is the one making the sketchy Corsair landing aboard carrier.
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gq61EV-FqYw]Carrier Operations 1953-54 - YouTube[/ame]
I also had interesting discussions with Dale Berven, a docent on the USS-Hornet, and his friend Julie(I can not remember Julie's last name...). Julie was great; I had a nice discussion with him while checking out a Corsair at the Palm Springs Air Museum, where he was a docent. Both flew Corsairs off Carriers in late WWII, and in to Korea. They also got to fly the first Cougar/Panthers.
This is an interesting video Dale made. Julie is the one making the sketchy Corsair landing aboard carrier.
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gq61EV-FqYw]Carrier Operations 1953-54 - YouTube[/ame]
alchemysa
Veteran Member
They sure did. They bombed us 62 times. In the first raid on Darwin they dropped more bombs than they did on Pearl Harbour. Over 250 people died.
Bombing of Darwin - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
We moved to Darwin about 10 years later and stayed for about 4 years. Interestingly by that time the Japanese were back, but this time they had a deal to cut up the ships they had sunk and were sending the steel back to Japan! (to make early model Toyotas I guess.)
Heres some rough scans of slides my father took at the time. The cut steel was loaded on other wrecks that were removed later.
There was an air show on around that time too. US planes were in town. Security was a little more relaxed in those days.
Attachments
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dmccarty
Super Star Member
The Battle of the Coral Sea stopped the Japanese advance to take Port Moresby in New Guinea and Milne Bay. If the Japanese had taken those two places, NE Australia would have been vulnerable to Japanese land based aircraft. It would have been ugly if their invasion had worked. Tactically the Japanese won at Coral Sea since the Allies lost one large, good carrier while the Japanese lost a small carrier with heavy damage to a large carrier.
Strategically the Allies won the Battle of Coral Sea because the Japanese advance was stopped. The Aussies with limited USA forces at Milne Bay were the first Allied soldiers to stop a Japanese ground attack. The heavy damage to the Japanese carrier kept it in port for months and it was not available at the Battle of Midway. That extra carrier at Midway could have changed the outcome of the battle.
The Japanese loses in aircraft and crews at Coral Sea was also the start start of the degradation of Japanese Naval air power. The Japanese never figured out how to quickly and effectively train pilots so every pilot KIA was a loss they could not afford. The Japanese also never changed their practice of operating air groups with carriers. The US doctrine allowed air groups to be pulled off a carrier for rest and rebuilding while a replacement air group went off to battle.
The Japanese linked their carriers with the air groups. An air group depleted by losses would keep a carrier in port until the air group was rebuilt. The Japanese never delinked their carriers from the air groups. It was a simple concept yet they never did it.
The US went so far as to have the fleet commands rotate in and out of service. One Admiral and related staff would take over a fleet of ships, change the fleet number to signify a change in command, while the previous Admiral and staff got a much needed rest. Of course the ships still stayed with the fleet so the Sailors and Marines only got to rest when a ship or maybe a task group got a chance to get to port.
Later,
Dan
dmccarty
Super Star Member
I have read about the problems with the copper mine but I did not know it was on Bougainville. The papers have been saying Papua-New Guinea which is a great big place. I thought the mine was on New Guinea not way out in Bougainville.
Later,
Dan
dmccarty
Super Star Member
Japanese air power was strong at the start of the war and this was mostly due to the combat experience of the Japanese vs the inexperienced US pilots. The Japanese planes were somewhat better but the key difference was experience.
There were some very good US air groups in the USN at the start of the war because their CO's had been thinking, planning, creating tactics and training to those tactics. Eventually their tactics such as the Thatch Weave and pairing up aircraft to watch each others tail via the weave became instrumental in the destruction of Japanese air power.
The Japanese mind set was attack, Attack and ATTACK. They never really teamed up in air combat like the US did which left them at a disadvantage. Air combat should be a team effort not a single player game. The Single Player almost always looses.
The tactics of many counties was to use three planes in a group. Thatch, and another officer whose name I cannot remember, figured out that two planes teamed together and working in a flight of four was the correct formation. The US was still using a three plane grouping which eventually got changed to two pairs of planes in a flight of four. Two planes fighting together allowed one plane to attack the enemy who was attacking the other plane in the pair. It was a very simple but very effective tactic.
Mind set had influence on their aircraft design. Their planes were designed to be fast and nimble. Making the planes fast and nimble made them good on the attack. In the 30's and early 40, fast and nimble meant light weight, low firepower, and little defensive add ons. This fit the Japanese mind set but very importantly to the geography in the Pacific, it also allowed long ranges. Long range was a very important design point.
The light, nimble, fast climbing and fast flying Japanese aircraft had many advantages. The range they had meant that they could find our ships, especially aircraft carriers well before our planes could find their ships. This was a big advantage. That range also meant they could fly out much farther than we could to attack. In boxing terminology they had longer reach. Our carriers as the start of the war had to charge towards the Japanese to get our planes in range of the enemy ships which is not a good thing. The Japanese range advantages also allowed their planes more time in the air to FIND our ships. These were important advantages, bought with lightly constructed aircraft, are often overlooked.
The US planes at the start of the war were shorter ranged, slower, less nimble, and climbed slower than the Japanese planes. On the other hand our planes were heavier which meant they could dive away faster from the Japanese planes. The planes were also heavier because of defensive armor, self sealing fuel tanks, and heavy 50 caliber machine guns.
One should always use what you have to your advantage and aim to attack the enemies weak points. Know what to do and how to do this is experience. It took some time for the Allies to figure this out. The US planes, especially the F3F and F4f Wildcats were slow, sluggish planes compared to the Japanese Zero. At the start of the war US pilots did NOT want self sealing fuel tanks because they added weight to the planes which slowed them down, reduced range, and made the planes more sluggish. Eventually better engines were used which helped nullify the weight issues but it really took the Hellcats and Corsairs to give the US a single engine plane that was superior to the Zero.
The added defensive weight in the US planes, especially in the early stages of the war did have advantages. The Zero had cannons that had limited rounds thus limited firing time but it was also limited in range. The Zero had to get close to use the cannons. The Zero's machines guns were light weight and there were only a couple of them and they again had to get close. The lighter 7.7(30 caliber) bullets also did not do much damage especially compared to the US 50 caliber. The Zero's weapons had a hard time dealing with the very robust US plane construction. On the other hand the 50 calibers in most US fighters had longer range, heavier weight, and heavier firepower that just tore the Japanese planes to pieces.
The Japanese failure to produce quality pilots in numbers to replace their losses is well known. Another problem the Japanese had was the lack of mechanics to maintain the planes. The simply did not have enough of them especially as they started to loose bases and the crews left behind. The Japanese never figured out to replace lost pilots, crews and ground crews.
Later,
Dan
There were some very good US air groups in the USN at the start of the war because their CO's had been thinking, planning, creating tactics and training to those tactics. Eventually their tactics such as the Thatch Weave and pairing up aircraft to watch each others tail via the weave became instrumental in the destruction of Japanese air power.
The Japanese mind set was attack, Attack and ATTACK. They never really teamed up in air combat like the US did which left them at a disadvantage. Air combat should be a team effort not a single player game. The Single Player almost always looses.
The tactics of many counties was to use three planes in a group. Thatch, and another officer whose name I cannot remember, figured out that two planes teamed together and working in a flight of four was the correct formation. The US was still using a three plane grouping which eventually got changed to two pairs of planes in a flight of four. Two planes fighting together allowed one plane to attack the enemy who was attacking the other plane in the pair. It was a very simple but very effective tactic.
Mind set had influence on their aircraft design. Their planes were designed to be fast and nimble. Making the planes fast and nimble made them good on the attack. In the 30's and early 40, fast and nimble meant light weight, low firepower, and little defensive add ons. This fit the Japanese mind set but very importantly to the geography in the Pacific, it also allowed long ranges. Long range was a very important design point.
The light, nimble, fast climbing and fast flying Japanese aircraft had many advantages. The range they had meant that they could find our ships, especially aircraft carriers well before our planes could find their ships. This was a big advantage. That range also meant they could fly out much farther than we could to attack. In boxing terminology they had longer reach. Our carriers as the start of the war had to charge towards the Japanese to get our planes in range of the enemy ships which is not a good thing. The Japanese range advantages also allowed their planes more time in the air to FIND our ships. These were important advantages, bought with lightly constructed aircraft, are often overlooked.
The US planes at the start of the war were shorter ranged, slower, less nimble, and climbed slower than the Japanese planes. On the other hand our planes were heavier which meant they could dive away faster from the Japanese planes. The planes were also heavier because of defensive armor, self sealing fuel tanks, and heavy 50 caliber machine guns.
One should always use what you have to your advantage and aim to attack the enemies weak points. Know what to do and how to do this is experience. It took some time for the Allies to figure this out. The US planes, especially the F3F and F4f Wildcats were slow, sluggish planes compared to the Japanese Zero. At the start of the war US pilots did NOT want self sealing fuel tanks because they added weight to the planes which slowed them down, reduced range, and made the planes more sluggish. Eventually better engines were used which helped nullify the weight issues but it really took the Hellcats and Corsairs to give the US a single engine plane that was superior to the Zero.
The added defensive weight in the US planes, especially in the early stages of the war did have advantages. The Zero had cannons that had limited rounds thus limited firing time but it was also limited in range. The Zero had to get close to use the cannons. The Zero's machines guns were light weight and there were only a couple of them and they again had to get close. The lighter 7.7(30 caliber) bullets also did not do much damage especially compared to the US 50 caliber. The Zero's weapons had a hard time dealing with the very robust US plane construction. On the other hand the 50 calibers in most US fighters had longer range, heavier weight, and heavier firepower that just tore the Japanese planes to pieces.
The Japanese failure to produce quality pilots in numbers to replace their losses is well known. Another problem the Japanese had was the lack of mechanics to maintain the planes. The simply did not have enough of them especially as they started to loose bases and the crews left behind. The Japanese never figured out to replace lost pilots, crews and ground crews.
Later,
Dan
