Re: National I.D. Card and a bit more...
Patrick (patrickg),
I presume by Season's Greetings that you mean Happy Halloween. Very appropriate - the festival of the dead!
I couldn't agree more with your observations regarding the need of the public for quick action as a palliative. This is a delicate balancing act - with too many agendas involved for my liking.
Straying a little (OK - I am a rambler), the fundamental issue is as you implied the capacity of the American public to endure in this conflict. There are lessons to be learned from the anti-terrorist actions that have gone on across the world during recent history.
Multiple members of my family have been involved in anti-terrorist operations over the past 50 years in what I will broadly term Europe, the Middle East and Africa. I grew up listening to many stories regarding what fanaticism does to a man (or woman). One of my earliest memories is of my mother crying all night because of a relative lost on an anti-terrorist operation.
I state those facts not because I want to sensationalize, but because that was everyday life for me growing up. That will become the reality now for probably thousands of American families.
I thought it might be of interest to share some of the common threads of the discussions I used to hear (in no particular order - just as I dredge through my memories):
1. None of the sustained counter-terrorist operations won any kind of 'war'. There were many operational victories - and some defeats - but the result overall was not a clear-cut win. The effective way to deal with a terrorist conflict in a foreign nation is to take out the ringleaders of the fanatics while at the same time encouraging and funding the development of the moderate majority. Once the ringleaders have been eliminated, most of the 'followers' in the terrorist organizations are more than happy to be gradually absorbed into a newly developed political system - albeit on the edges. It should be noted that in all these cases the moderates often share many goals of the terrorists - but their mode of achieving them is not violent. You can deal with people like that. It should also be noted that it is extremely hard for anti-terrorist operatives to stomach this kind of modest victory - they will have seen friends die at the hands of some of the people that end up on the edges of the new moderate regime/government.
2. Regular troops are ridiculously ineffective against terrorists or in a guerilla war. I've heard several stories about anti-terrorist teams being in the field - and in observation of a terrorist camp when an army unit came through. The unit may find the camp - but the terrorists will have melted away - leaving the unit to report one more deserted camp. The anti-terrorist / special ops guys regard these incidents with a combination of humor and frustration - they may have been in position for days - observing - not able to share location with the regular forces for a variety of reasons.
3. Ethics in the field. This is perhaps the hardest issue. When do/can you intervene. What do you do when a local child herding goats stumbles on your observation post? (Kill him quietly or expose your position and likely get killed?) What do you do when you have to watch the terrorists abusing/torturing local people? They can gather intelligence by slowly skinning you alive if/when they catch you (some always get caught) - you can only ask questions if you catch a terrorist. Bear in mind that the Afghans have a particularly cruel history - as Kipling wrote:
"When you're wounded and left, On Afghanistan's plains, And the women come out, To cut up your remains, Just roll on your rifle, And blow out your brains, And go to your Gawd, Like a soldier."
The Russians also experienced this.
4. Human Intelligence. There are many stories about being inserted into the middle of nowhere and having to get back out again (with no terrorists in sight). There are even more stories about the difficulties of distinguishing terrorist from villager. To be effective requires local knowledge. It takes weeks and months of observation and gathering of local knowledge to understand just the basics. Human intelligence - preferrably with help from people of the same people group - is critical. Any special forces guy will tell you that they almost always learn new ways to live off the land in a particular country/region from the locals. That's just one reason why the special ops teams should always have a linguist.
5. Group targets don't work. Most terrorists are accidental ones. They were just unlucky and weak-minded enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time when they were recruited - or they are there for the regular meals. It's the leaders you want to target. Only when the leadership of these groups realizes they are being picked off in a quiet and efficient manner will they start to become fearful. Once the leaders are removed, a good transition plan involving local potentates is usually effective in bringing the 'followers' back into the mainstream population. If you hit the whole group then you unite them - it's best to be selective.
6. Political need for success. On the home front there will be tremendous pressure for the guys in the field to produce. This is not helpful and often results in lives being lost to meet someones political goals. I know it's unrealistic - but I really wish the news organizations would stop asking about when the special ops guys are going to strike.
7. Difficulty adjusting to and from life in action. Anti-terrorist operatives often become so involved in the effort that they stay behind in the country for years after the official effort has been stopped - helping to restore order. It is incredibly hard to pull out of the field for a few weeks with the wife and kids and then be re-inserted. While you are out there you may see on a regular basis women and children of the same age as your family being abused or killed as collateral damage.
8. Pressure from pacifistic groups - propaganda. In line with the ethics question. What if a terrorist decides to murder and mutilate one of his own people, take pictures and send them to some pacifist group accusing the special ops people of doing it? I guarantee something like this will happen. Perhaps Al Sharpton will feel compelled to fly out with a team to investigate special ops brutality? Similar things have happened before and history does have a habit of repeating itself if we don't learn from our mistakes. Look at Jesse Jackson dithering even now over whether to respond to his supposed request from the Taleban to fly out and mediate. How about the next request goes to Louis Farrakhan after we have lost a few men - perhaps with coverage similar to that from Mogadishu?
This turned out longer than I had intended - anyway, some food for thought.
Patrick
Patrick (patrickg),
I presume by Season's Greetings that you mean Happy Halloween. Very appropriate - the festival of the dead!
I couldn't agree more with your observations regarding the need of the public for quick action as a palliative. This is a delicate balancing act - with too many agendas involved for my liking.
Straying a little (OK - I am a rambler), the fundamental issue is as you implied the capacity of the American public to endure in this conflict. There are lessons to be learned from the anti-terrorist actions that have gone on across the world during recent history.
Multiple members of my family have been involved in anti-terrorist operations over the past 50 years in what I will broadly term Europe, the Middle East and Africa. I grew up listening to many stories regarding what fanaticism does to a man (or woman). One of my earliest memories is of my mother crying all night because of a relative lost on an anti-terrorist operation.
I state those facts not because I want to sensationalize, but because that was everyday life for me growing up. That will become the reality now for probably thousands of American families.
I thought it might be of interest to share some of the common threads of the discussions I used to hear (in no particular order - just as I dredge through my memories):
1. None of the sustained counter-terrorist operations won any kind of 'war'. There were many operational victories - and some defeats - but the result overall was not a clear-cut win. The effective way to deal with a terrorist conflict in a foreign nation is to take out the ringleaders of the fanatics while at the same time encouraging and funding the development of the moderate majority. Once the ringleaders have been eliminated, most of the 'followers' in the terrorist organizations are more than happy to be gradually absorbed into a newly developed political system - albeit on the edges. It should be noted that in all these cases the moderates often share many goals of the terrorists - but their mode of achieving them is not violent. You can deal with people like that. It should also be noted that it is extremely hard for anti-terrorist operatives to stomach this kind of modest victory - they will have seen friends die at the hands of some of the people that end up on the edges of the new moderate regime/government.
2. Regular troops are ridiculously ineffective against terrorists or in a guerilla war. I've heard several stories about anti-terrorist teams being in the field - and in observation of a terrorist camp when an army unit came through. The unit may find the camp - but the terrorists will have melted away - leaving the unit to report one more deserted camp. The anti-terrorist / special ops guys regard these incidents with a combination of humor and frustration - they may have been in position for days - observing - not able to share location with the regular forces for a variety of reasons.
3. Ethics in the field. This is perhaps the hardest issue. When do/can you intervene. What do you do when a local child herding goats stumbles on your observation post? (Kill him quietly or expose your position and likely get killed?) What do you do when you have to watch the terrorists abusing/torturing local people? They can gather intelligence by slowly skinning you alive if/when they catch you (some always get caught) - you can only ask questions if you catch a terrorist. Bear in mind that the Afghans have a particularly cruel history - as Kipling wrote:
"When you're wounded and left, On Afghanistan's plains, And the women come out, To cut up your remains, Just roll on your rifle, And blow out your brains, And go to your Gawd, Like a soldier."
The Russians also experienced this.
4. Human Intelligence. There are many stories about being inserted into the middle of nowhere and having to get back out again (with no terrorists in sight). There are even more stories about the difficulties of distinguishing terrorist from villager. To be effective requires local knowledge. It takes weeks and months of observation and gathering of local knowledge to understand just the basics. Human intelligence - preferrably with help from people of the same people group - is critical. Any special forces guy will tell you that they almost always learn new ways to live off the land in a particular country/region from the locals. That's just one reason why the special ops teams should always have a linguist.
5. Group targets don't work. Most terrorists are accidental ones. They were just unlucky and weak-minded enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time when they were recruited - or they are there for the regular meals. It's the leaders you want to target. Only when the leadership of these groups realizes they are being picked off in a quiet and efficient manner will they start to become fearful. Once the leaders are removed, a good transition plan involving local potentates is usually effective in bringing the 'followers' back into the mainstream population. If you hit the whole group then you unite them - it's best to be selective.
6. Political need for success. On the home front there will be tremendous pressure for the guys in the field to produce. This is not helpful and often results in lives being lost to meet someones political goals. I know it's unrealistic - but I really wish the news organizations would stop asking about when the special ops guys are going to strike.
7. Difficulty adjusting to and from life in action. Anti-terrorist operatives often become so involved in the effort that they stay behind in the country for years after the official effort has been stopped - helping to restore order. It is incredibly hard to pull out of the field for a few weeks with the wife and kids and then be re-inserted. While you are out there you may see on a regular basis women and children of the same age as your family being abused or killed as collateral damage.
8. Pressure from pacifistic groups - propaganda. In line with the ethics question. What if a terrorist decides to murder and mutilate one of his own people, take pictures and send them to some pacifist group accusing the special ops people of doing it? I guarantee something like this will happen. Perhaps Al Sharpton will feel compelled to fly out with a team to investigate special ops brutality? Similar things have happened before and history does have a habit of repeating itself if we don't learn from our mistakes. Look at Jesse Jackson dithering even now over whether to respond to his supposed request from the Taleban to fly out and mediate. How about the next request goes to Louis Farrakhan after we have lost a few men - perhaps with coverage similar to that from Mogadishu?
This turned out longer than I had intended - anyway, some food for thought.
Patrick
