</font><font color="blue" class="small">( I have been down this road before. That is why I suggested to you the undeniable proof it was you at your computer.)</font>
Mike.. That is what I was saying in my post above. In all of my policies that I write, it doesn't matter. Most companies with a good IT/IS staff and fully fleshed out security policies are the same way. To put it bluntly... if person A is able to do something and make themselves look like person B, then person B is still at fault (possible firing offense if passwords were freely given to another person, but still requiring disciplinary action even if the user legitimately lost a password due to writing it down or something).
</font><font color="blue" class="small">( 1. Without biometerics and programs/procedures/policies to enforce them "properly" there is NO way they can prove your driving the machine at some time.)</font>
Whether it was or wasn't shouldn't be the issue... see above response. What was done and how it was done are the only two issues.
</font><font color="blue" class="small">( 2. Time itself can be altered)</font>
Not with properly configured domain security. Take for instance, our users are standard users only. They cannot install software, change settings or do much of anything other than what the defined use for that PC is. In our entire organisation, there are only 3 computers that regularly run with anything higher than standard user priveleges. When good security practices are followed, there is a defined use for a computer. The computer should be configured so that it will function ONLY for the defined use. This single item is the biggest saving grace for a company with tight security. In most cases a computer cannot be infected with a virus even if there were no antivirus software installed. The virus trys to gain hold and write itself all over the PC but can't because it has to get a foothold with the same authority as the user (who basically has none). There is only a VERY small subset of viruses that use Operating system flaws as the entry point, probably less than .5%. Those still require traditional anti-virus software and diligent patching of OS and applications to protect the PC. In a typical corporate environment with tight security, spyware also is a non-issue. It cannot install itself because of the tight security configuration.
</font><font color="blue" class="small">( 3. Machines can be remote controlled)</font>
Only by administrators, and all allowed remote control programs installed in a domain should create logs.
</font><font color="blue" class="small">( 4. Your entire IT infrastucture could be comprimised and they don't know it)</font>
Only if it is run by a ragtag band of wannabes or people with no real world experience (paper education only).
</font><font color="blue" class="small">( 5. Your IT staff is following some trail program, but has not the knowledge or research available to see the bigger picture)</font>
This one is entirely possible.
</font><font color="blue" class="small">( 6. Are the policies and procedures defined as monitoring/corrective action available to see as you are using your computer?)</font>
I can't comment on that one because I'm not quite sure what you are talking about.
Don't get me wrong with any of the above. From everything Inspector has told us, it sounds like he has nothing at to worry about if the IT staff if any good. But with the above, I'm just saying that the arguments you are presenting won't really matter (due to the points I mentioned) if there is a really strong and fleshed out IT security policy in place.
